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This article gives an overview of legal and procedural uncertainties regarding genome
edited organisms and possible ways forward for European GMO policy. After a recent
judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ judgment of 25 July 2018, C-528/16),
organisms obtained by techniques of genome editing are GMOs and subject to the same
obligations as transgenic organisms. Uncertainties emerge if genome edited organisms
cannot be distinguished from organisms bred by conventional techniques, such as
crossing or random mutagenesis. In this case, identical organisms can be subject to
either GMO law or exempt from regulation because of the use of a technique that cannot
be identified. Regulatory agenciesmight not be able to enforce GMO law for such cases in
the long term. As other jurisdictions do not regulate such organisms as GMOs, accidental
imports might occur and undermine European GMO regulation. In the near future, the
EU Commission as well as European and national regulatory agencies will decide on
how to apply the updated interpretation of the law. In order to mitigate current legal and
procedural uncertainties, a first step forward lies in updating all guidance documents
to specifically address genome editing specifically address genome editing, including
a solution for providing a unique identifier. In part, the authorization procedure for GMO
release can be tailored to different types of organisms bymaking use of existing flexibilities
in GMO law. However, only an amendment to the regulations that govern the process
of authorization for GMO release can substantially lower the burden for innovators. In
a second step, any way forward has to aim at amending, supplementing or replacing
the European GMO Directive (2001/18/EC). The policy options presented in this article
presuppose political readiness for reform. This may not be realistic in the current political
situation. However, if the problems of current GMO law are just ignored, European
competitiveness and research in green biotechnology will suffer.
Keywords: GMO regulation, future policy, CJEU C-528/16, directive 2001/18/EC, genome editing, new genetic
modification techniques (nGM), CRISPR/Cas, directed mutagenesis
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INTRODUCTION
This article gives a brief overview (section The ECJ Judgment
and Its Ramifications) of what kinds of problems the European
Union’s (EU) regulatory framework for genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) faces in the wake of the ECJ judgment
Confédération paysanne a.o. on directedmutagenesis (ECJ, 2018).
In a second step (section Roads Forward), policy options are
discussed that could avert a crisis for European agricultural
innovators and a crisis of enforcement for regulatory agencies.
This crisis results from the inadequacy of the current regulatory
framework to proportionately, predictably, and enforceably
regulate organisms that have been bred by genome editing.
The term genome editing as used in this article refers
to a variety of new techniques, specifically techniques of
directed mutagenesis using CRISPR/Cas9 (or similar site-
directed enzymatic DNA cleavage or base-editing in the sense
of SDN1/2; see Podevin et al., 2013), or other techniques
such as oligonucleotide directed mutagenesis. These techniques
allow breeding organisms in which the genetic material has
been altered to an outcome that is genetically indistinguishable
from the possible outcomes of conventional breeding, i.e.,
traditional breeding by crossing and natural variation as well
as conventionally used techniques of chemically or radiation-
induced random mutagenesis. Throughout this article, the term
“genome edited organism” (GEO) refers to an organism that has
been altered by such techniques to an outcome that cannot be
distinguished from a conventionally bred variety or a naturally
occurring variant thereof. Note that this use of the term does
not include every alteration that is possible with these same
techniques; especially it excludes transgenic modifications (e.g.,
SDN3 with CRISPR/Cas9 and donor DNA with a sequence from
another species as repair template; see Podevin et al., 2013).
That is to say, the definition of GEO used throughout this
article is outcome based, not process based. The same techniques
can also be employed to alter an organism in a way that is
easily distinguishable from conventionally bred varieties or a
naturally occurring variant. The focus of this article, however, is
on organisms that cannot be distinguished.
A reference scenario for the cases discussed in the following
is a GEO that contains a point mutation, which provokes a
frameshift in the DNA code or changes the code to form a stop-
codon, both of which may knock-out a certain gene (loss of
function mutation). For example, resistance to powdery mildew
in barley occurs naturally and is caused by a loss of function
mutation in the Mlo gene. Genome editing can place a point
mutation in the equivalent of that gene in barley varieties
that are not mildew resistant yet or in other plants that are
susceptible to mildew such as wheat or tomato (e.g., Acevedo-
Garcia et al., 2017; Nekrasov et al., 2017). A point mutation, such
as a frameshift mutation in the Mlo gene in a barley variety,
can be detected by sequencing if the sequence of the parent
organisms is known. But it is often not possible to identify
the cause of the mutation, i.e., establish whether the mutation
occurred naturally or by conventional random mutagenesis and
subsequent backcrossing or through directed mutagenesis (see
e.g., Lusser et al., 2012; Bartsch et al., 2018; Grohmann et al.,
2019). Indeed, if the only alteration introduced is nothing else
than one single base mutation, then it is not at all possible
to identify the technique used. The reason for this is that a
wide variety of mutations in the genome occurs constantly in
nature, most often during reproduction. In particular, double
strand breaks of the DNA occur naturally and are subsequently
repaired by the natural cellular repair mechanisms of non-
homologous end joining and homology-directed repair. Those
are the same kind of breaks in the DNA that can be introduced
by the CRISPR associated enzyme CAS9 (and others). And the
subsequent cellular repair mechanisms (non-homologous end
joining and homology directed repair) are also the same as
used in directed mutagenesis used in directed mutagenesis. In
addition, a fabricated nucleic acids template (donor DNA) may
be introduced in the lab to control the outcome of the mutation
event and, e.g., accurately reproduce an alteration that is known
to have emerged naturally in that variety. In consequence,
for some small alterations that blend well into the genetic
background (such as a single nucleotide frameshift mutation)
it is impossible (without additional knowledge such as e.g., lab
reports) to identify whether they occurred naturally or whether
they are humanmade. Such identification based on sequence data
alone is indeed even impossible on theoretical grounds, unless
a technique were to preferentially incorporate certain isotopes
or leave an epigenetic pattern, which however is not currently
known and most certainly might only apply to single techniques
under very specific conditions. It is true that if more genes
or more copies of a gene (e.g., in polyploid organisms) have
been altered in the same fashion, probabilistic considerations
could provide evidence for the use of genome editing or similar
techniques. However, data on intraspecies variation (for specific
varieties and even for specific loci) is quite sparse for most plant
species and even for many agriculturally relevant crops (e.g.,
see Jiao et al., 2012 for an assessment of genetic changes in
conventional maize breeding and note how sparse the data seems
to be for this major crop). The lack of knowledge on natural
occurrences of mutations makes it difficult to establish whether a
mutation is reasonably possible to occur naturally or not (a brief
overview on comparison with naturally occurring mutations is
given by Custers et al., 2019). Thus, on sequence data alone, a
small alteration as discussed in this scenario is only detectable
if a comparator sequence is given. If no relevant information is
given in addition to the sequence—e.g., when controlling imports
of agricultural commodities–small alterations made by genome
editing can often neither be detected (because of the reasons
listed above) nor is the technique identifiable that led to the
alterations. In particular, this would be the case in our reference
scenario ofMlo locus altered barley.
For further discussion on existing and upcoming detection
and identification strategies, see Grohmann et al. (2019).
THE ECJ JUDGMENT AND ITS
RAMIFICATIONS
On July 25th 2018, the European Court of Justice delivered its
judgment in a case concerning among others the scope of the
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mutagenesis exemption in the European GMO Directive (ECJ,
2018). For a detailed analysis of the judgment see e.g., Seitz (2018)
or Faltus (2018), a brief analysis in English is given by Purnhagen
et al. (2018b) and Garnett and Beck (2018). The ruling has the
following implications:
(1) The GMO definition in Art. 2(2) i.c.w. Annex I A of
the GMO Directive 2001/18/EC1, taking into account the
reference to techniques of genetic modification in Art. 3
i.c.w. Annex I B, applies to all organisms in which the genetic
material has been altered by techniques of mutagenesis (ECJ,
2018, 32-38). This means that it does not matter what
the alterations to the genetic material of an organism are
and whether they are extensive or insignificantly small, any
organism bred with a technique of (random or directed)
mutagenesis is in legal terms a GMO.
(2) The exemption for organisms produced by mutagenesis
from the obligations of the GMO Directive (mutagenesis
exemption in Dir. 2001/18/EC, Art. 3 i.c.w. Annex I
B) applies only to techniques of mutagenesis that “have
conventionally been used in a number of applications and
have a long safety record” (the Court here refers to Rec. 17:
ECJ, 2018, para 44-46, 48-53). Referring to the precautionary
principle (para 47-50), the Court further interprets the
aforementioned wording of Rec. 17 as not applying to
techniques “which have appeared or have been mostly
developed since the Directive was adopted” (ECJ, 2018, para
51). Thus, techniques of genome editing—which have been
mostly developed after adoption of the Directive in the year
2001—are not exempted from the obligations of GMO law.
In consequence, the ECJ does not differentiate betweenGEOs and
transgenic organisms in all respects. Both are regulated as GMOs
and subject to the same obligations, i.e., risk assessment, expiring
market approval, post-release monitoring, liability, labeling.
Indeed, the Court’s reading of the Directive’s GMO definition and
mutagenesis exemption also applies to “downstream” directives
and regulations that interact with the GMO definition i.c.w.
Annex IB of the GMO Directive (ECJ, 2018, para 60-68;
Purnhagen et al., 2018b).
This verdict has left scientists, breeders as well as officials
from regulatory agencies perplex (the competent authorities of
several countries, among them Sweden and Germany, assumed
a differential treatment of GEOs before the ECJ judgment, e.g.,
see BVL, 2017; Eriksson, 2018a). The ruling ultimately reflects
the fundamental problem of European GMO law: Long before
the request for a preliminary ruling had been addressed to
the ECJ, the legislator failed to acknowledge and incorporate
decades of technologic development, especially the capacity of
new techniques to alter the genetic material of organisms to a
result that is indistinguishable from conventional breeding or
natural variation.
Three major uncertainties result from the failure to account
for technological change:
1Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified
Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC. 106, 1–39. Available
online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/18/oj (accessed March 1, 2018).
First and foremost, regulatory agencies will have a hard time
implementing the verdict because they do not have the means
to enforce compliance with GMO legislation in the case of
fraudulent or unintentional non-declaration (cf. Faltus, 2018).
Several large exporting nations of agricultural products outside of
the EU have chosen to regulate (at least some) GEOs no different
from conventionally bred varieties, thus not requiring any tracing
or labeling of those GEOs (cf. Sprink et al., 2016; BMEL, 2018;
Duensing et al., 2018; Wolt and Wolf, 2018). Non-declaration
is then particularly likely to occur in international trade with
agricultural commodities and it is precisely where regulatory
agencies will fail for a variety of reasons. GEOs are in practice not
distinguishable from conventionally bred varieties (discussion
above). Since the technique is regulated as conventional breeding
in several non-EU jurisdictions, soon a large number of varieties
will be brought to market outside of the EU, without any
notification procedures in most countries. European regulatory
agencies would now have to somehow keep track of all of
them, in order to identify them. This affects the enforcement
of the regulations on deliberate release of GMOs (as generally
laid down in the Directive 2001/18/EC), the enforcement of
the regulations on (unintentional) transboundary movements
of GMOs (as laid down in Regulation EC No 1946/20032), the
ability of authorities to enforce the compliance with traceability
regulations (as laid down in Regulation EC No 1829/20033 and
No 1830/2003), the ability of authorities to enforce the 0.9%
tolerance threshold for conventional products contaminated
by GMOs (as laid down in Regulation EC No 1830/20034)
and finally the ability of authorities to enforce the EU’s zero
tolerance policy for unauthorized GMOs, particularly in the case
of agricultural commodities. For such regulatory enforcement,
there are hardly enough inspectors and technical means (such
as next-generation whole genome sequencing machines) as well
as not adequate means for investigation with which to retrace
complex malpractices if only isolated accidental mis-declaration
of agricultural goods is given as probable cause. In fact, cases
of unauthorized release that have only been noticed after years
of malpractice exist even with conventional transgenic GMOs
such as in the petunia case (Bashandy and Teeri, 2017), despite
the fact that transgenic organisms should be comparably easy to
identify. In addition, sooner or later a few rouge breeders that
release GEOs in their gardens or fields might come to public
attention, similarly to the case of “CRISPR cabbage,” where the
involved plant geneticist mocked authorities by stating “if I don’t
tell you, [which alterations I made to the cabbage planted in
2Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
July 2003 on Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms (Text
with EEA relevance). 287, 1–10. Available online at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/
2003/1946/oj (accessed March 1, 2018).
3Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food And Feed (Text with EEA relevance).
268, 1–23. Available online at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1829/oj (accessed
March 1, 2018).
4Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 September 2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labeling of Genetically
Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced
from Genetically Modified Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/18/EC. 268,
24–28. Available online at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2003/1830/oj (accessed
March 1, 2018).
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my garden] you will not find out” (Kupferschmidt, 2018). Public
interest in such cases will not cease while regulatory agencies
remain unable to enforce the ECJ judgment outside of medium
to large-sized breeding companies that apply for commercial
permits and patents for their new breeds. Such a situation can
erode confidence in Union legislation and in the capability of
authorities to keep food and feed products on the European
market safe.
Second, uncertainties arise regarding the specifics in the
procedure of approval of GMOs (for a brief overview of the
assessment procedure and its challenges, see Halford, 2019;
Schiemann et al., 2019). Currently passing an application for
placing on the market of a GMO (especially for cultivation
and in some member states even for field trials) represents a
significant regulatory barrier for innovators. The big driver of
cost of such an application is its long and unpredictable duration,
as a notifier might be asked to provide additional evidence
midway through the process of application for authorization of
GMO release. Compared to conventional GMOs however, the
uncertainties for innovators that want to bring GEOs to market
are far superior, because is yet unknown how applications of all
kinds will be handled in the case of organisms that resemble
conventionally bred varieties (i.e., for field trials, for market-
release of non-food&feed and for food&feed). For example, when
applying for market-release, notifiers must provide detection and
identification techniques (unique identifier) in order to reliably
distinguish the GMO in question from any other organisms
(Directive 2001/18/EC, Annex III A, sec. II, C, 2(f) and Annex
III B, sec. I & II, B, 5, as amended by Commission Directive
2018/350)5. Will the regulatory agencies just accept a reference
to the specific DNA-sequence of the alteration? Or will they
refuse some GEOs on the account that the alteration is too
small to allow for reliable identification? Or will they even
resort to asking breeders to incorporate a transgenic “marker
sequence” to facilitate tracing of GEOs? Similarly, it is not clear
yet which methods of identification will be accepted with regard
to the environmental risk assessment that is intended to ascertain
among others whether the alteration of a GMO is not transferred
to the environment (especially if the GEO in question is not
necessarily distinguishable from organisms present at the site of
release). How regulatory agencies will implement the judgment
regarding such issues is yet unknown and most companies will
stop product development for the European market under these
uncertain conditions.
Third, wide-ranging uncertainties remain concerning
the interpretation and the legal effects of the
ECJ judgment.
• How safe is safe enough? The ECJ, following the referring
court, qualified techniques of directed mutagenesis as
techniques of which “the risks for the environment or
5Commission Directive EU No 2018/350 of 8 March 2018 amending Directive
2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards the
Environmental Risk Assessment of Genetically Modified Organisms. 67, 30-45.
Available online at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/350/oj (accessed September
12, 2018).
for human health have not thus far been established with
certainty” (ECJ, 2018, para 47). Basedmainly on precautionary
considerations and on the wording of Recital 17 (which
requires a “long safety record”), the Court judged that
these techniques are not excluded from GMO law by the
mutagenesis exemption. However, knowledge on the safety
of these technologies will change over time, as does the
length of their safety record. This raises legal uncertainties
as to what happens when—at some point in the future—the
technology of genome editing can be considered safe with
certainty (e.g., if in 20 years genome editing is routinely
used for medical applications). Will the judgment have to be
interpreted differently then?
• Which technologies exactly are excluded from the obligations
of the Directive? The court held that the mutagenesis
exemption does not apply to “techniques/methods of
mutagenesis which have appeared or have been mostly
developed since adoption of the Directive,” that is to say
since the year 2001 (ECJ, 2018, para 51). Finding out which
technologies are meant requires a thorough historical study
of breeding techniques in that time. Note that the history is
quite intricate. Some techniques of directed mutagenesis have
appeared well before the year 2001 and had even some history
of development and use in plants, albeit not widespread
commercial use (e.g., oligonucleotide-directed mutagenesis
in maize or tobacco, see Beetham et al., 1999; Zhu et al.,
1999). On the other hand, some techniques of chemically
or radiation induced random mutagenesis in use today
can be considered to have been mostly developed after the
year 2001, even more so regarding commercial applications
in plant variety breeding (e.g., ion-beam mutagenesis, see
Matsumura et al., 2010). In fact, the methods and techniques
used in “conventional” mutation breeding do also progress
rapidly and markers, dosages as well as mutagens used today
significantly differ from the ones used at the time of adoption
of the Directive–technological progress did not stop (a brief
overview is given by Oladosu et al., 2016). In short, which
technologies exactly are excluded by the judgment (ECJ,
2018, para 51) is not evident. But did the Court really make
the interpretation of the mutagenesis exemption dependent
on the details of a historical study of mutagenesis breeding
techniques? If not, then the judgment must somehow explain a
categorical distinction that underlies the historical argument.
Indeed, in the buildup of the interpretation of Rec. 17 (ECJ,
2018, para 45-51) the ECJ assigns different categories of risk
to all random mutagenesis techniques on the one hand and
all techniques of directed mutagenesis on the other. Making
reference to the findings of the referring court, the ECJ regards
the techniques of directed mutagenesis (in bulk) as a risk on
account of their ability “to produce [. . . ] varieties at a rate and
in quantities quite unlike those resulting from the application
of conventional methods of random mutagenesis” (ECJ,
2018, para 48). Thereby it clearly does not hold a historical
argument applying to all newer mutagenesis techniques
equally, but it differentiates between random techniques of
mutagenesis on one side and directed mutagenesis on the
other. The Court however did not further clarify wherein the
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risk consists in such a case. Does the Court deem the speed of
the breeding process as a risk in itself or the ease of application
of new techniques of directed mutagenesis? At least one of
the two seems to be the case and this argument seems to be
more important to the court than the historical details of
the technological development. However, all new breeding
technologies could be a risk in itself in this sense. How then
will different kinds of future technologies be valuated, if they
should allow an improved efficiency in breeding? Agreement
on which techniques of mutagenesis are excluded from the
obligations of GMO law after the ECJ judgment and which not
is hardly possible unless the ECJs criteria are clarified. This is
not least the case for new randommutagenesis techniques (i.e.,
not directed mutagenesis) that have been mostly developed
after adoption of the Directive (and concomitantly do/did not
have a long safety record).
• How far-reaching are the implications of the judgment? It is
clear that the judgment also impacts directives and regulations
“downstream” of the GMO Directive (i.e., regulations that
depend directly or indirectly on and/or are affected by the
mutagenesis exemption of the Directive). For instance, the ECJ
was clear that the judgment is also relevant to the common
catalog of varieties of Directive 2002/53 (ECJ, 2018, para 58-
60). But do some of these considerations also apply to the
Directive 2009/41/EC6 on the contained use of GM micro-
organisms (cf. Kahrmann and Leggewie, 2018)? Either way,
some member states might have to revise their own national
GMO laws and regulations as a consequence of the judgment,
as their wording does not conform to the new interpretation
of the mutagenesis exemption. Furthermore, the judgment
raised a methodological question regarding ECJ case law. Did
the Court mean to set a precedent and (generally or under
specific circumstances) revert to a historic reading instead of
a dynamic interpretation of undefined legal terms? If that were
the case, the judgment would have a huge and lasting effect on
biotechnology law (Seitz, 2018).
Only further clarifications by the ECJ can finally settle these
legal uncertainties. Given current uncertainties, it is possible that
within the next years another national court will refer similar
or entirely different questions regarding Directive 2001/18/EC
in a preliminary ruling procedure, that have an effect on the
interpretation of the judgment. In fact, concerned individuals
or organizations who have the time, risk-readiness and funds
might take the initiative and initiate a law suit to probe the
ECJs judgment (see corresponding remarks in Table 1). In
addition, a national court would have to be willing to draft
appropriate questions. On the other hand, there is the option of
legal change.
Any of these three categories of uncertainties weighs heavily
on research and development decisions, not only in large
multinational companies but also all the way down to basic
research in plant science and agricultural systems (Smyth and
6Directive 2009/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
May 2009 on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro-organisms.
125, 75–97. Available online at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/41/oj (accessed
March 1, 2018).
Lassoued, 2019; Zimny et al., 2019). It is not surprising that
calls to urgent action are soaring, such as a recent call signed
by scientists from 118 life sciences research institutions (VIB,
2018). If the situation remains unchanged, this will soon
result in loss of competitiveness for Europe’s green-biotech
industry, for breeding and seed industries and for European
agriculture. In addition, trade disruptions and concomitant
economic consequences might follow if the zero-tolerance policy
is indeed enforced and imports are halted by authorities based
on suspected low-level presence of unapproved GEOs (Ryan
and Smyth, 2012; cf. Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2014). Even a
WTO trade dispute might ensue, similar to the USA, Canada
et al. vs. EU cases DS291-293 on the import of GMOs to the
European market, that ended in disadvantage for the EU (cf.
WTO Reports of the Panel, 2006). Indeed, ten countries have
already taken issue with the disruptive consequences of the ECJ
verdict for international trade, demanding to “avoid arbitrary
and unjustifiable distinctions between end products derived
from precision biotechnology and similar end products obtained
through other production methods” (WTO, 2018).
It is now the task of the Union legislator to update regulation
in order to adequately reflect recent developments in breeding
techniques and to prevent a crisis of enforcement.
ROADS FORWARD
Any way forward from the status-quo has to address present
uncertainties and deliver solutions tailored to new breeding
techniques. A number of possible courses of action are feasible
and allow for a sustainable development of European GMO
policy that has the potential to bring Europe back on track in
agricultural biotechnology (see Table 1).
Make Use of Flexibility Within Current
Legal Framework
GEOs do not fit squarely into the current regulatory framework
(discussion above), mainly because legally they are GMOs but
biologically they often are indistinguishable from organisms bred
by conventional techniques that are not regulated as GMOs.
Regulatory agencies therefore need to use the flexibility they
have legally in their disposition to tailor regulatory processes
to GEOs.
There are two main ways of authorization of GMOs in
the EU, depending on the goal of the applicant (Voss, 2006;
Roïz, 2014): Authorization for the deliberate release into the
environment of a GMO (according to Directive 2001/18/EC)
is the “default” way of authorization. It is possible to apply
for an authorization for placing on the market of a GMO
for any commercial purpose, i.e., cultivation, importation or
transformation of GMOs into industrial products (according
to Directive 2001/18/EC, part C). Typical examples are the
importation of GMO flowers or the placing on the market
of MON810 seeds for cultivation. It is also possible to
apply for deliberate release for non-commercial purposes, i.e.,
an experimental release such as a field trial (according to
Directive 2001/18/EC, part B). Authorization for placing on
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TABLE 1 | Table of genome editing directed policy options for different actors. Sorted by timing.
Action Actors Start of
effecta
Effect
Make use of flexibility within current legal framework:
– Transparency: revise guidance documents explicitly addressing GEOs
– Predictability: if not scientifically warranted, do not ask for additional
information or further assessments
– Lower barriers for GEO authorization, especially for field trials and
non-food&feed release
Regulatory agencies in
member states and on
European level
1 year (Slightly) lowering legal
uncertainty
Amend Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013:
– Scale process of approval to allow differential treatment for different types
of gmos, i.e., explicitly addressing geos
– Relax ERA duration and number of locations, adapt to hypothesis of risk
– 90 days feed studies only where hypothesis of risk
– Relax monitoring modalities to hypothesis of risk
EU commission 2-5 years Lowering cost for
innovators
Update Annexes II, III, VI, VII of GMO Directive 2001/18/EC:
– Scale process of approval to allow differential treatment for different types
of GMOs, i.e., explicitly addressing GEOs
EU commission 2-5 years Lowering cost for
innovators
Probe ECJ judgment by putting new cases to trial:
– Clarify what is a long safety record for mutagenesis
– Clarify if every smallest base edit really leads to GMO in the sense of Dir.
2001/18/EC Art. 2(2)
– Clarify how judgment is enforced regarding non-detectability
Various stakeholders 3-10+ years Lowering legal
uncertainty
Amend, supplement or replace GMO law (primarily Dir. 2001/18/EC):
– Amend Dir. 2001/18/EC Art. 2(2) or Art. 3 i.c.w. Annex IB to exclude geos
– Amend Dir. 2001/18/EC Rec. 17: What is long safety record?
– Supplement by specific act for geos
– Replace by outcome-based regulation (e.g., novel trait)
– Replace by sectorial law
EU parliament &
commission
5-10+ years Solves all issues,
including enforcement
issue
Develop new technologies (speculative):
– Alternatives to altering germline DNA for breeding e.g., epigenetic
modifications, mRNA interference or proteome modifications are not
currently regulated
– Alternative employments of techniques of conventional (by chemicals or
radiation, in vivo) mutagenesis
Basic research Decades Circumventing
regulation
a All timespans given in table are only rough estimates. The values for “start of effect” are estimated based on the following evidence: The duration of release or amendment of regulations
by the parliament and/or by the commission can be estimated based on the history of e.g, Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 641/2004. Regulation
(EC) No 1829/2003 was adopted by the commission on 25.7.2001 and the date of its official publication was 22.9.2003, i.e., 2 years (without timespan for implementation). In the
case of Commission Regulation (EC) No 641/2004, which is based on Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 the date of effect is 7.4.2004, which is presumably even less than one year after
drafting. Other regulations have been released within similar timeframes. The duration of the committee procedure of article 27 i.c.w. Art. 30(2) of the GMO Directive 2001/18/EC can
be estimated on prior instances of its application. On 8.3.2018 changes to various Annexes of the GMO Directive were implemented (Commission Directive EU No 2018/350) involving
a committee procedure, whereby the first draft was published on 10.11.2016, giving the procedure a total timespan from drafting to publication of c. 1.5 years. The estimate was
heightened to 2–5 years since changes to the annexes of Directive 2001/18/EC are only effective in combination with amendments in the corresponding regulations. The estimates of
2–5 years given above are slightly more generous, to account for the politically delicate nature of the amendments and a longer timespan required by authorities to apply new legislation
in the regulatory process. Amendments to the Directive have been brought into force on four dates (07.11.2003; 21.03.2008; 02.04.2015; 29.03.2018) between publication of Directive
2001/18/EC and Nov 2018 (see history of amendment available on http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/18/oj), which allows to deduce a span of 3-8 years. The duration of a major
redrafting and replacement of the entire Directive was estimated as 5-10+ years based on the timeframe it took for Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 March 2001 to be drafted and replace
its antecessor Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990. The process of redrafting did of course not start immediately after publication of 90/220/EEC but only a few years later. The first
proposal by the commission was published on 26 Nov 1997, hence the estimate of a minimum of 5 years. After implementation into the directive of the above legislative procedures
on European level, transposition by member states might take about 1.5 years (e.g., this is the timeframe for Commission Directive EU 2018/350). The duration of legal actions that
involve a clarification of GMO law is very unpredictable and the vague span of 3-10+ years reflect this fact. Finally, research and development of new breeding techniques is ongoing
(e.g., CRISPR mediated epigenetic modification) but technologies developed in basic research usually take decades to be transferred to market readiness.
the market of GMOs as food and feed is the way to go
for all products that are intended for food or feed use and
contain GMOs, are produced from GMOs or contain GMO
ingredients (according to Regulation 1829/2003 and Commission
Implementing Regulation EU No 503/2013). An authorization
for cultivation of a GMO for food and feed production can
also be obtained in this way. Obtaining authorization for the
import of GMO commodities is easier than for cultivation. While
MON810 is the only GMO currently authorized for cultivation
in the EU (but opted-out by 19 EU member states), numerous
GMOs are authorized for various uses other than cultivation
(see the GMO registers at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/dyna/
gm_register/index_en.cfm and http://gmoinfo.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
gmc_browse.aspx; pers. comm. by a reviewer).
To carry out these processes of authorization, multiple
regulatory agencies are involved on all levels from EU to
the member states regions in some cases. Member states
institutions alone are responsible for authorization of field
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trials (national risk assessment and national authorization) but
member states and EU institutions are jointly responsible for
market authorization of GMOs (for import of commodities,
for cultivation and as food and feed), in which case an
EU-wide authorization process including risk assessment is
carried out by EFSA and supported by national authorities
(Directive 2001/18/EC1 part B and part C respectively, and
Regulation 1829/2003). In addition, in the case of cultivation
in a certain member state, obtaining a national risk assessment
is required.
In practice, regulatory agencies are always subject to
member states’ or the union’s political interests and–legal
obligations set aside—their attitude regarding smooth and
efficient administrative procedures goes a long way toward
providing an innovation friendly regulatory landscape. In the
next fewmonths, all regulatory agencies (partly independently on
EU level and in member states) will decide on how to implement
the ECJs judgment. They have considerable freedom in doing
so and their decisions will certainly at least slightly reshape the
regulatory landscape—for better or for worse.
To address the aforementioned uncertainties and avoid a
disproportionate regulatory burden for GEOs, the following
considerations should guide regulatory agencies in implementing
the ECJs judgment:
First and foremost, given the complex situation in the
aftermath of the judgment, transparency is key. To reduce
uncertainty regarding GEOs, it is important that regulatory
agencies communicate transparently howGEOswill be treated by
publishing new guidelines (e.g., EFSA guidance documents) that
explicitly cover organisms gained by all relevant new techniques
and different kinds of alterations. All possible obstacles in the
process of application that could arise with GEOs should be
addressed in guidance documents in order to (at least slightly)
lowering legal uncertainty. It is the duty of regulatory agencies
to ensure a high predictability of regulatory decisions and
transparent and simple guidelines are a first step.
Second, the process of authorization should take account
of the indistinguishability of GEOs from conventionally bred
organisms. Thereby, it is the regulatory agencies duty to evaluate
organisms gained by new techniques on scientific basis alone.
While the ECJ has invoked the precautionary principle based
on the mere possibility of risks (ECJ, 2018, para 48) as a
reason to place new techniques under GMO regulation, the risk
assessments in applications for authorization of GMOs within
the bounds of those laws can only be based on scientific method
and scientific evidence. GEOs that cannot be distinguished from
conventionally bred varieties cannot involve more or less risks
than these conventionally bred varieties themselves, unless the
risks do not stem from the alterations made to the genetic
material of the organism but instead from the methods used
(for instance by introducing unintended alterations that amount
to a relevant new trait but somehow escape our notice; it is
a bit ironic then that the ECJ judgment, para 48, designates
haphazard alterations as not presenting a risk in organisms
altered by chemical and radiation-induced mutagenesis whereas
it is presumably regarded as the main source of risk in GEOs).
Anyhow, there is currently scientific consensus that the new
techniques are in principle safe (Leopoldina, 2015; Gao et al.,
2018; VIB, 2018; cf. Diekämper et al., 2018) and this consensus is
successfully paving the field for medical applications of the same
techniques (e.g., Baylis andMcLeod, 2017; Ginn et al., 2018). Pre-
release monitoring is a legal requirement and therefore at least a
standard evaluation has to be conducted also on GEOs, even if
no particular risks are expected to be associated with the specific
alterations introduced into the organism. But it is not possible
to empirically assess risks that are not known and cannot be
foreseen, i.e., for which there is no scientific hypothesis to test
for.When confronted with such risks, scientists have two options.
A disproportionate option is to test various kinds of evidence
at random and hope for a serendipitous discovery of a hazard.
In such a case however, there is no scientific measure by which
testing can be completed and no reason for preferring one kind
of evidence over another (in simple words: how is someone to
decide at which point to end testing, if nothing is found?). The
only judicious option is to perform a few standard tests and
focus on facilitating early detection in post-release monitoring
(in simple words: if nothing relevant came up in standard testing,
assume all is good. But if ever a hazard comes up, be ready and
react quickly). Therefore, as long as not even a hypothesis is given
as to how an organism, e.g., barley with an Mlo point mutation,
that has been bred by genome editing has higher risks than
another organism bred by “conventional” techniques, e.g., barley
with the sameMlo point mutation, then testing should stop after
a few empirically meaningful standard tests. This second option
is the one that regulatory agencies should apply to GEOs, as long
as no hypothesis of risk is given, neither from the technology nor
from the organism’s traits.
Indeed, the GMO Directive (2001/18/EC) leaves some
freedom to tailor the regulatory process to cases of low risk, such
as most GEOs:
First, it was one of the goals of the 2001 amendment to fixate
(and thereby shorten) the duration of single steps and the overall
duration of the process of application for authorization of GMO
release (Voss, 2006). The timespan from application to decision
could be reduced in principle to a swift 6–9 months for market-
release in the case of cultivation (for an in-depth discussion of
timing in the process of authorization see Voss, 2006). To keep
up with the timeframe envisaged in the Directive it is however
crucial that authorities do not ask for additional information
after notification, as this allows prolonging the timespan beyond
the norm. Consequently, the Directive stresses that authorities
requesting additional information require a solid reason for so
doing (cf. Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 6(7), Art. 14(4), Art 15(1),
Art 18(1)). As GEOs in most cases do not present a scientifically
grounded risk (discussion above), there can be no warranted
reason for an authority to prolong the process by asking for
further tests or additional information, unless in response to new
scientific evidence.
Second, the Directive (2001/18/EC) allows for adapting the
modalities of assessment to different types of GMOs and
their different concomitant risks. Its Art 7(1) allows for the
application of differentiated (simplified) procedures if sufficient
experience has been obtained by releases of certain GMOs
in certain ecosystems and sufficient evidence of safety is
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available (Directive 2001/18/EC1 Art. 7(1) i.c.w. Annex V). For
placing on the market of certain types of GMOs, a competent
authority or the Commission may propose to derogate from the
general requirements for the notification procedure Directive
2001/18/EC1 Art. 16(1). And on scientific grounds such as
low risk, an application might dispense with part of the
information for post-release handling Directive 2001/18/EC, Art.
13(2). In addition, for the environmental risk assessment, the
information required “may vary depending on the type of the
GMOs concerned” [Directive 2001/18/EC, Annex II (B)]. In
fact, individual applications for release shall not be required
to present information “where it is not relevant or necessary
for the purposes of risk assessment in the context of a specific
notification” (Directive 2001/18/EC, Annex III, as amended by
Commission Directive 2018/350). In short, risk assessment can
and should be tailored to the type of GMO in question and GEOs
are definitely a special type of GMOs (cf. similar arguments by
Bratlie et al., 2019 and Eriksson, 2018b).
Third, the Directive does not prescribe specific scientific
methods of risk assessment (as is normal for a legal act of
this category), i.e., specific qualitative vs. quantitative methods,
which varieties to compare with, in the lab or in the field,
null hypotheses, sample sizes, specific values for statistical
significance etc. It simply lists different risks that have to be
assessed and maintains that studies have to conform to usual
standards (Directive 2001/18/EC, Annex II (C), as amended
by Commission Directive 2018/350). Consequently, authorities
could draw more strongly than they do now on different kinds
of readily available evidence including theoretical considerations
and evidence from published scientific literature on similar types
of GMOs. In particular, it should in most cases suffice to “refer
to data or results from notifications previously submitted by
other notifiers” cf. Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 6(3) and of course
to evidence from “releases of the same GMOs [...] outside the
Community” cf. Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 13(3); note that in
the case of GEOs we will soon have abundant information.
The type of scientific evidence (e.g., from a study conducted
on the whole organisms vs. from theoretical considerations that
estimate risks) and the level of detail required in response to each
subset of considerations should be allowed “to vary according to
the nature and the scale of the proposed release” (cf. Directive
2001/18/EC, Annex III). Note that this is not meant as a cut
on rigor of risk assessment but only as a methodological change
within the bounds of scientific method choice. Why should
from a scientific standpoint a single locally confined field trial
be more representative for the effects of a specific trait than
knowledge from its agricultural use across decades? In the case
of GEOs the traits are often already known from decades of
cultivation in conventionally bred varieties. In the most simple
terms: Systematic reviews and evidence maps based on known
risks have to suffice when no scientific hypothesis is available
against which empirical testing can be done, which is the case for
many GEOs (as discussed above).
Of course, the flexibility extant in the GMO Directive is a
breadless argument in some respects. On the one hand, even if
a soft administrative change along these lines was accomplished,
applications for placing on the market of GMOs could still
get stuck in the committee voting procedures. Consequently,
the timespan from notification until committee voting might
decrease, but after voting there wouldn’t necessarily be more
successful authorizations than today—unless member states
bring into better alignment their committee votes or other
incentives are given (as e.g., the instatement of a “GMO opt-
in mechanism” proposed by Eriksson et al., 2018). On the
other hand, regulatory agencies are not free to act on the
Directive directly but they have to take into account how the
Directive has been transposed in the member states. In addition,
while the GMO Directive (2001/18/EC) is the centerpiece of
GMO legislation, other regulations are in place that narrow
the flexibilities discussed above. Especially the regulations for
GMO food and feed (discussion of Commission Implementing
Regulation EU No 503/20137 below) do lay out the process
in much more detail and in a more restrictive manner that
leaves less freedom to treat GEOs any differently than transgenic
GMOs. In practice, most GMOs apply for market approval as
food and feed. Still, there are field trials and releases for non-
food&feed purposes (e.g., industrial enzymes or raw materials
for the production of biopolymers, biofuels, paper, starch etc.;
EFSA, 2009) that do not in principle fall under that regulatory
regime and could therefore profit from more flexibility, as
regulated according to part B and part C of Directive 2001/18/EC
respectively. And the Commission Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 503/2013 is not itself completely devoid of flexibility,
e.g., its Art. 5(2) concedes that an application may have to fulfill
less requirements if this can be justified for the GMO in question.
The take home message is that if member states and
their regulatory agencies are willing, slightly defusing legal
uncertainties for GEOs is already possible by adjusting
procedures and communicating transparently, even before
tackling legislation. While the aspect of flexible implementation
should not be underestimated, especially since it is the first thing
that will happen, the fundamental problems of GMO law cannot
be solved by such means.
Amend Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 503/2013
Applications for authorization for placing on the market of
GMOs as food and feed are regulated among others by
the Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified
Food and Feed which is implemented by the Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 on Applications for
Authorisation of Genetically Modified Food and Feed. While
the Regulation 1829/2003 and other regulations leave a lot
of flexibility for regulatory agencies to shape the process of
assessment, the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No
503/2013 lays down concrete criteria and prescribes scientific
methods to be applied by regulatory agencies. The two most time
7Commission Implementing Regulation EU No 503/2013 of 3 April 2013 on
Applications for Authorisation Of Genetically Modified Food and Feed in
Accordance With Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and
of the Council and Amending Commission Regulations (EC) No 641/2004 and (EC)
No 1981/2006 (Text with EEA relevance). 157, 1–48. Available online at: http://data.
europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2013/503/oj (accessed March 1, 2018).
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consuming and costly scientific requirements of the assessment
process are:
(1) The environmental risk assessment, which has to be
carried out with field trials on a minimum of 8 sites
that have to be representative for the GMOs receiving
environment and often cover multiple years [cf. Commission
Implementing Regulation EU No 503/2013, Annex II, II. Sci.
Req. 1.3.2.1(b)].
(2) The mandatory toxicology assessment by 90-day feeding
studies on rodents (cf. Commission Implementing
Regulation EU No 503/2013, Annex II, II. Sci. Req. 1.4.4.1).
Both these assessment procedures have been scientifically
supervised and evaluated. The procedure of environmental
risk assessment has been criticized repeatedly for leading to
results that are not comparable, as no common test protocol
is implemented (e.g., Hilbeck and Otto, 2015; Priesnitz et al.,
2016; Fernández Ríos et al., 2018). Moreover, it has recently been
suggested to adapt the methods of risk assessment for new types
of GMOs (Duensing et al., 2018). The current regime of 90-days
feeding studies for toxicology assessment has been criticized, as
“the performance of rat feeding trials with whole food/feed for
the risk assessment of a GM plant would not result in additional
information pointing at possible health risks” as compared to less
expensive studies and biochemical characterization (G-TwYST,
2018; cf. similar results in GRACE, 2018). In other words, both
these tests are lengthy and expensive but do not seem suited
to reveal new risks that cannot also be investigated by other
means. These results call for a change in assessment procedures
for all GMOs.
Regarding GEOs in particular, the addition of a caveat
explicitly exempting them from such studies (90-day feeding
studies and extended field trials), provided that the alterations
introduced are deemed non-hazardous based on theoretical
considerations and currently available scientific evidence, would
constitute a decisive improvement. With any such update
to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013,
the European Commission can significantly lower regulatory
hurdles for agricultural innovators. On the other hand, GEOs
would still be subject to all other obligations of GMO
law and many applications that are geared toward more
agricultural sustainability, with small alterations that improve
existing varieties, will not become economically attractive unless
exempted from all obligations of GMO law.
Update Annexes II, III, VI, VII of GMO
Directive 2001/18/EC
An additional option for lowering the regulatory burden for
innovators bringing GEOs to market is an update to technical
progress to Annexes II, III, VI, and VII of the GMO Directive,
which is provided for by statute with recourse to a Committee
Procedure that has to be initiated by the European Commission
(Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 27 i.c.w. Art. 30(2), referring to
Committee Procedure of Decision 1999/468/EC). An explicit
exemption for GEOs for some of the obligations laid down in
these Annexes might have an effect if followed by a diligent
implementation in the concomitant regulations. However, as
a single measure, upgrading the annexes is not adequate
to mitigating the uncertainties for GEOs, as the Directive
already leaves relative freedom to deal with different types of
GMOs and individual cases (discussion above). By contrast, the
fundamental problems lie in themain body of the GMODirective
(2001/18/EC) and its Annex IB, as these define the scope of
the law. This part, however, cannot be tackled by a Committee
Procedure but requires an ordinary legislative procedure.
Amend, Supplement or Replace GMO Law
(Primarily Directive 2001/18/EC)
Being more transparent and flexible regarding regulatory
procedures (sectionMake Use of FlexibilityWithin Current Legal
Framework) and lowering the costs of applications for market
approval of GEOs (section Amend Commission Implementing
Regulation) is not enough. The most significant uncertainties
stem from foreseeable problems with enforcement, particularly
when taking into account global trade (discussion in section
The ECJ Judgment and its Ramifications). Regarding GEOs
specifically, it has to be somehow ensured that organisms that
cannot be distinguished from organisms bred with conventional
techniques, which currently do not fall under the obligations
of the GMO Directive, are regulated equally–or at least in a
pragmatic manner similarly, also taking into account economic
feasibility. Solving this issue is the centerpiece to finding a
solution to the new uncertainties in European GMO regulation.
The following options could accomplish this task, for example
(in any combination):
• Amend the GMO Directive (2001/18/EC), for example by
(A) revising the wording of the GMO definition in Art. 2(2)
in order to exclude organisms that could also have been
obtained by conventional breeding techniques or/and (B)
updating the mutagenesis exemption in Art. 3 i.c.w. Annex
IB to additionally exclude GEOs (cf. Dutch Proposal, 2017)
or/and (C) clarifying what constitutes a “long safety record”
in the sense of Rec. 17.
• Supplement the GMO law by a new act that specifically applies
to GEOs, at least among others. This is maybe politically more
feasible and efficient than opening up the entrenched debates
on adequate regulation for GMOs in general. It has also been
suggested to transfer competencies back to member states for
specific cases (cf. the idea of an “opt-in Directive” by Eriksson
et al., 2018; slightly outdated scenarios for regulation of NBTs
in Purnhagen et al., 2018a). The drawback of additional acts
is that the core of GMO law will still have to be revised at a
later stage, as new technological developments will again put
pressure on old GMO law, such as epigenetic modifications
or gene drives (gene drives are not GEOs in the sense
of this article but transgenic organisms and the scientific
community is very much aware that they present high risks
unless very specific conditions are met, cf. Akbari et al., 2015;
Brown, 2017).
• In terms of complete replacement of GMO law, there are
plenty of options. An obvious choice would be to develop
an outcome-based regulation (e.g., novel trait), as this is a
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means to ensure that the law automatically keeps up with
technological progress (cf. Huang et al., 2016). Opponents
of the current horizontal legislation of GMO release might
propose replacement by sectorial regulation, as this allows
a more customized treatment of e.g., plant varieties with
higher starch content vs. e.g., future medical applications that
may require a permit for release. A new tiered approach
has recently been proposed by the Norwegian Biotechnology
Advisory Board (Bratlie et al., 2019).
This article does not provide further discussion and evaluation of
such options. There is no shortage of ideas for renewed legislation
and it is far too early to hypothesize on which options might
find political majorities more easily. In order to solve the issue of
GEOs, the broad goals of amending, supplementing or replacing
legislation are clear: (1) Updating the regulatory framework
in a way that specifically addresses GEOs, including issues of
regulatory enforcement. (2) Making the regulatory framework
more flexible to future developments in green biotechnology and
allowing fast and predicable incorporation of recent scientific
evidence. (3) Finding a balance between precautionary regulation
and allowing sustainable innovation. European legislation is a
lengthy process and that is why the involved actors have to start
acting soon.
Although this is speculative, in several decades new
technologies will be developed that might be shaped by the
current regulatory hurdles for GMOs. For example, techniques
of conventional mutagenesis, which are currently exempted
from all obligations for GMOs, might be developed further and
maybe employed differently, in order to allow much faster and
efficient breeding, e.g., in combination with future enhanced
molecular markers. And in the long run, it might become
possible to circumvent all aspects of the current regulatory
regime by developing breeding techniques that do not change
the “genetic material” of an organism (see remarks in Table 1).
Such future breeding techniques could draw on e.g., epigenetic
modifications (cf. Thakore et al., 2016), CRISPR-interference
(cf. Dominguez et al., 2016), mRNA interference or proteome
modifications. Either way, as new breeding methods develop
over the next decades, the gap between the scope of the current
regulatory framework and technical possibilities will widen and
put additional pressure on a complete overhaul of European
GMO law.
CONCLUSION
Companies and research institutions that employ new breeding
techniques are confronted with considerable legal uncertainties
after the recent ECJ judgment. While in principle uncertainties
tied to the process of application for authorization of GMO
release can be addressed by procedural changes on a lower
level, problems of enforcement with organisms that are
indistinguishable from the result of conventional breeding
techniques cannot be solved without an amendment of European
GMO legislation. There are various options for legal change
that all share the common necessity of treating organisms
that are indistinguishable from non-GMOs equally if they are
devoid of known additional risks—that is, to exclude them from
most or all obligations of GMO regulation as well. This is by
no means a statement for less rigor, as organisms with novel
traits that are associated with risks should still be assessed and
regulated thoroughly.
Any such solution however requires the constructive
involvement of European institutions and member states. The
roads forward presented in this article are thus mere possibilities
in an optimistic scenario that presupposes political willingness
to act. This may not be realistic in the current political situation.
However, if the problems in GMO law are just ignored a state
of crisis will ensue: Regulatory agencies will struggle to enforce
GMO-regulation, international trade relations will be affected,
European agriculture loses an opportunity for sustainable
innovation and jobs in research and development will be
relocated elsewhere.
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